[upbeat music] Hello, my name is Gustavo Ribeiro. I'm the editor-in-chief of the Brazilian Report.
And welcome to yet another, uh, episode of Explaining Brazil, our podcast. And this week we're going to talk about, uh, a problem that, uh, has come to stay, Brazil-US, uh, trade tensions.
Uh, as you know, the US has imposed 25% tariffs after a Section 301 investigation into alleged unfair trade practices from Brazil, and then slapped an additional 12.5%, uh, accusing Brazil of, among 60 other countries, of not doing enough to curb, uh, goods, trades of goods with forced labor.
Um, happy to jo- to be joined this week by Welber Barral. Welber, uh, w- is a consultant, a trade consultant, and served as Brazil's National Trade Secretary in the Lula and Dilma administrations.
Uh, Welber, welcome again to our podcast. And, uh, once again, we're talking about, uh, Brazil-US trade wars. [laughs] And exactly. Lot of, a lot, [laughs] lot of issues to talk about.
Thank you, Gustavo, for the invitation. Pleasure to be here. So Welber, uh, can you give our listeners who might not be following this too close, uh, what, where things stand right now?
I mean, we, we have several exceptions to these, um, to these tariffs.
We have tariffs that are only facing, only, and I put between, uh, quotation marks, only facing 25%, others only 12%, and others 35.5, 37.5%.
So w- w- what is the state of Brazilian exports to the US, uh, tariffs, uh, wise? Yeah. So Gustavo, just to understand wh- how, how Brazil has been affected.
We have a 301 against Brazil, it was specifically against Brazil. It began last year. It imposed 25% on Brazilian imports with a lot of exceptions.
Then you have the 12.set, 5% derived from the 301 investigation on forced labor that you mentioned, and that added 12.5%. So we have different situations.
About 30% of the Brazilian exports have 35.7% today, but we also have other products affected by the 35 or 12.5%, and we have 232s, uh, that affect iron and steel and aluminum, uh, or, or furniture, and that adds more
20 to 25% of Brazilian exports. So one consequence of that is that the participation of the US in Brazil exports today is less than 9%. That's the lesser number in 200 years, just to give you an idea.
And on the other hand, of course, Brazilian exporters are looking for new markets, and they are given a help with the recent trade agreements as, uh, signed by Mercosur. This is the current situation.
Now, Brazil has traditionally been a very insular economy and, uh, I mean, until a decade ago, Mercosur only had a handful of trade deals.
And, uh, for instance, uh, this weekend, we had, uh, an agreement with Singapore that came into effect, and it was the first in the decade since then, uh, Brazi- uh, Brazil and Mercosur signed other, uh, trade deals.
Do you think that this tariff war that Washington is erecting against Brazil is giving more push for Brazil to open up its economy?
Or was the, the will to do that already there, and this is just making these efforts more evident to the general public? Well, I, I think that these efforts are becoming more, uh, visible and feasible.
What I mean is, because of Trump, many... and because of the Trump actions, many countries in the world are trying to diversify and close trade agreements.
The agreement with the European Union and Mercosur, for example, has been negotiated for 25 years. Finally, it was signed. It's in effect. The same happened with the EFTA countries and Mercosur.
Uh, Singapore, as you mentioned. Now, we are probably going to conclude before the end of the year an agreement between Canada and Mercosur.
Then there are other agreements on the pipeline with the, the, the Emirates, uh, with, uh, Vietnam, with Indonesia, Japan, Korea. So Br- the Mercosur countries are opening, but they are opening on a bilateral basis.
So part of the problem of the US negotiation with the Brazil was that the US was demanding a unilateral opening of the Brazilian market without concessions, and that's, uh, that's what they signed with Argentina.
But with Brazil, it's not going to work. And you mentioned that this is a political move by the US rather than a, a strictly trade move.
Um, and that actually Brazil was left no option to, uh, uh, accept the US' demands. And you have been, uh, representing several, uh, companies and trade associations.
How do you see these negotiations and, uh, what is the root, uh, of these tariffs?
So first of all, uh, I, I know that the Brazilian government, the US government, they had more than 30 meetings along this semester But they couldn't reach an agreement.
And part of that was because the US proposed exactly the same agreement they signed with Argentina and Guatemala.
Brazil is neither of that, and some of the requests, like, uh, uh, access, priv- privileged access to the Brazilian mineral sector or, for example, unilateral, uh, concessions regarding, uh, certification from the US, could even f- uh, conflict with the Brazilian constitution.
So th- some of these demands do not recognize, uh, not only Brazil's legal system, but also the political momentum.
Brazil is in the middle of a campaign for general elections, so there are no incentives for the current politicians to make concessions to the US, and I think they are mistaken, many of them, th- their assumptions about Brazil.
That's one thing. The second thing that you mentioned is we are working with different sectors, exporting sectors, and the, really, they are very different situations.
You have some situations, for example, coffee and beef, they were excluded from the tariffs by the United States, mostly because last year there was inflation in the US because of this kind of tariffs.
So they are very important, uh, exports, and they were excluded.
You have other sectors, like, uh, furniture or that were ve- that had the US as a major market, and they are diverting now to other markets trying to, to reduce the damage from the tariffs.
And then you have other sectors, mostly, uh, consumer goods, like, uh, footwear or textiles, in which the US is not a major importer from Brazil, but some companies were dedicated to exporting to the US.
So you don't have a sectorial effect, but you have an individual effect for some companies. And, uh, do you think that this could deliver a death blow to, uh, many companies, shed jobs in Brazil?
What do you see as the immediate effects to the Brazilian economy? Because the headline numbers are not that catastrophic, but when, once you put that into a microscope, then the picture changes, right?
That's, that's exactly that. So overall, you are not going to see an effect on the macroeconomic scenario in Brazil. We're still go- going to have 2.5 growth this year.
Uh, Brazil is having a surplus, the, uh, y- we have the biggest surplus in history, in fact, mostly because of the price of commodities and the price of oil. But Brazil have a huge surplus anyway.
Uh, most sectors, they, they are focused on domestic market, and then they also export to the region, so the US is not a major, uh, uh, a major center for their exports.
But for some companies, especially middle size companies, you are going to see some effect. That, that happens, for example, with furniture or very specific situations in which, for example, uh, uh, kitchen cabinets.
Kitchen cabinets had a raise in tariffs because they were considered national security in the US by the 232.
And, uh, some small to middle size companies only exported to the US, not to other markets, they are going to have a blow, especially Santa Catarina and Paraná states.
And the government's l- is making some loans, uh, through the, the development bank, the BNDES, to, to keep these companies afloat. And do you think that, uh, this is the right move?
Uh, is there, is there other things that the government could and should be doing to, uh, prevent these companies from collapsing? Yeah. They...
W- what they are doing, they are, uh, offering these loans for companies that are, were heavily affected. They are also postponing the payment of taxes so the companies can keep their, uh, their working capital.
Uh, and they are offering financing for exports. I think that's, uh, that's the right move, especially again, for middle size companies in these sectors that ha- w- employ, uh, a large workforce.
So this is really necessary at this point. Also, Gustavo, as you know, everything is political this year. Everything looks at the electoral calendar. So the government is doing these kind moves also to capture votes.
And talking about politics, because, uh, the first, the very first reaction from the Brazilian government, and this came from the presidency, so it's, it's not a small thing, was talking about Brazil's, uh, reciprocity law.
This is a piece of legislation that was passed with the EU in mind.
Uh, Congress started to vote it and move it forward because of the EU anti-deforestation regulations that Brazil, uh, see as barely disguised green protectionism.
But then it became very handy o- once, uh, Donald Trump's trade war started pointing its guns towards Brazil. Uh, it is not... Retaliation would not be automatic.
There's, uh, a lot of hoops that the government would have to jump. Uh, but do you think that, uh, the government will, uh,
activate any of these levers before the election, or just keep talking about it as a political, um, element rather than a practical one? So that, that's a very good question, but j- just to come back to history.
The first Brazilian reciprocity law was approved 2008- Uh, and, uh, basically because of the Cotton case against the United States.
At that time, Brazil approved the retaliation, and j- like, one week before the retaliation, the USTR came to Brazil and reached an agreement with the Brazilian government.
I was in government at the time, uh, so I was a witness of everything that happened. After... But at that time, uh, to retaliate, the Brazilian law required a final decision from the, the WTO.
What happened this year, uh, or, or last year, in fact, with the, the unanimous approval from Brazilian Congress, was to allow the Brazilian executive to retaliate without a final decision from the WTO.
That's a, and that's a major change.
So, uh, the, the, the, the, the reciprocity law is, i- it's, it, it reflects or it was inspired by the 301, the Section 301 for the United States, in the sense that Brazilian goods are being discriminated.
And of course, you have a lot of pressure now in Brasilia. You have pressure from some sectors that are, that want more protection, and they want to, tariffs against, uh, US exports.
You have some sectors who are interested on suspending patents, for example. They are doing lobbying in Brasilia. Uh, you have the political class that- Well, which are those sectors? Can you, can you, uh, uh, uh,
talk about which sectors want what? Like, who wants the patents to be broken? Who wants retaliation? Who doesn't want retaliation? So, in terms of, uh... You have very specific interests.
You have very specific interests, let's say, from companies that produce, uh, motorbikes in Brazil, to companies who produce, uh, uh, some, uh, things that co- that, uh, uh, uh, compete with, uh, U- US whiskey.
Or you may have companies that, uh, that produce equipment, oil equipment, this kind of thing, that they want higher, uh, tariffs against US exports. On the other hand, the Brasilia Pharmaceutical- And if I may...
A- and if I may just interrupt you. Yeah.
But, uh, there is an event going on in Brasilia called the MotoWeek, uh, of motorcycle, uh, the motorcycle community, and Harley Davidson was not made part of that event this year.
So just, uh [laughs] Well, that's, that's one sign. And then, let's say on patents, uh, the Brasilia pharmaceutical companies, of course, they want...
They look five years ahead, so they know what, which patents could be suspended, and they would be capable of s- producing it in Brazil and selling it at a v- much lower price to the Ministry of Health, which is the biggest buyer in the world.
On the other hand, you have, let's say, fintechs or, uh, or startups, and their associations would love to block anything related to the big techs in Brazil.
Uh, and all this lobbying is happening in Brazil to, to impose retaliation. As you said...
Oh, oh, and then you have the political class, who criticize Lula and pressure Lula, saying that the government has been weak with the United States. And in a political year, that makes a difference.
It's particularly sensitive. So you have all these pressures on one side.
And of course, on the other side you have especially the US companies based in Brazil or has a sub- subsidiary in Brazil, and, uh, they th- they are trying to appease things here. And, uh,
you mentioned one time that, uh... I read a text that you wrote calling the suspension of patents a sort of nuclear option. Uh,
what would the effects be in both the Brazilian relationship with the US, but also, uh, in local markets? Because that, that would be an unprecedented move, right? Well, in fact, that happened in the past.
But, but, but, but, uh, okay, so that happened in the past, especially the, the AIDS debate between Brazil and the US, and finally they reached an agreement at the WTO during the, the, at the beginning of the Doha Round.
The... So that happened in the past. But, uh, uh, the second thing is the, the, the procedure is not immediate. Like, there is a procedure, uh, in the law. It go to Camex, the Chamber of Ministers.
You have public consultation, hearings, uh, legal technical opinions, technical rebuttals, uh, before a decision is taken. So it's not something immediate.
But on the other hand, uh, Brazil has this memory that only after very painful threats were posed, like in the Cotton case, uh, it was when the US began really negotiating.
So you have, uh, these groups that, uh, they recall the past and the past experience with the United States.
Of course, suspending patents is not good for anyone, and you can have, uh, you can have effects on, on, on, on development, on research, on investment, uh, and the government knows that.
But then on the other hand, you have this pressure that I mentioned to you, the cost of buying, uh, medicine, for example, pharmaceuticals with patents in Brazil is very high, and there's also a good, a good argument, on the contrary.
And do you think that it is feasible for the government...
And yes, you mentioned it is not an automatic thing, but do you think that the government could launch any procedure before the election, or no, this is something that only if Lula wins re-election, then in his fourth term we would see
Something taking shape in a clearer way I think they could begin the, in fact, they began the, the, the, the procedure last year, but it didn't move. So they could move on with the procedure at CAEMX.
Uh, again, it would take a lot of months before, not this year, before a final decision is taken to impose, uh, a retaliation. But basically, that will depend on what's going to happen along the semester.
I know that Brazil will insist in the negotiations. There will be other meetings. Uh, that will depend which other measures the US can adopt.
Uh, Brazil tried a lot f- with the US for not having the stacking between the three, two 301s. Uh, and the, the, the US did not accept that, so that really, uh, create, uh, well, frustration from the Brazilian side.
And as I said, the electoral times are very sensitive for the government to react to these pressures.
So, uh, that will depend not only on the local pressure, but also what can happen between Brazil and the US before the end of the year.
So you dealt with the US and you just mentioned that, uh, once the IPs became under threat, that, uh, in the cotton case, the US decided to play ball with Brazil.
But that was a very different Washington than the one that we have today, right? And I know that you have been back and forth. Your consultancy firm has just opened a Washington, uh, bureau. Uh, how do you see this
US administration as opposed to previous ones in regards to its trade relationship with Brazil?
Well, the first thing is we've been working with the US for many years, and the very fact is that after the Obama administration, not even Trump, but the, the Obama administration, we have seen less relevance given to the multilateral system.
It was Obama who began blocking the judges at the appellate body of the WTO. We saw the US agreeing less and less with multilateral initiatives.
So Trump, in this sense, is more a symptom than a cause of this, this abscess, uh, for the US, uh, for the US in the international scenario.
So, and it's interesting that many, uh, tariffs that Trump imposed in his first term were kept by Biden. So the relationship has been deteriorating, at least with Brazil, for many years now.
As I said, 20 years ago, the US were, was 25% of Brazilian exports. In the beginning of the last century, it was 50%. Now it's less than 9%. It- it's declining. So, uh, on one hand, you have less and less influence.
You have more and more dependency on the Asian markets. And at the same time, of course, there's a lot of relationship, and we have to promote the relationship.
It, it can be a very, uh, fruitful relationship for both countries.
But the level of instability from the US side and the misunderstandings about Brazil, because proposing the agreement they proposed to Brazil is really knowing nothing about Brazilian politics and the Brazilian legal system.
So this kind of misunderstanding can still create damage for both sides. And you mentioned the US share in the Brazilian exports, uh, going down and down and down.
Uh, when we look at the share that the Chinese have, it's the opposite trend.
And I mean, I'm not just talking about the overall exports, which are one-third of Brazilian exports go to Chinese ports, but I'm also talking about manufactured goods, because the, uh, the US remains the number one market for Brazilian industrialized goods, but China is, uh, increasing its importance in that too.
It's no longer the case of just soy or, and oil. Uh, the China has overtaken Argentina, uh, with, uh, around like 12% of Brazilian industrialized goods.
It's on par with the EU and not that far below the US. Uh, h- how do you see this industrial relationship, uh, th- this relationship of Brazilian industries in China?
Uh, and I mean, how do you see this overdependence of China, uh, as a risk for the Brazilian economy in the long run? Yeah, yeah. You, you're right, and these are very good questions for the Brazilian strategy.
On one hand, uh, China, uh, I don't... It was the exactly the opposite. 30 years ago, China was about 5% of Brazilian exports. Now it's 30%. So Brazil is too dependent on China, and that's a risk.
Not because of China, but because if you have a crisis in China, it could affect Brazil heavily. If you have a reduction of demand in China, Brazil would be affected.
So, uh, uh, and the Brazilian reaction, again, has been trying to promote more trade agreements and diversify its, uh, uh, its exports. Uh, on the other hand, uh, China is a great buyer.
Brazil has more than $100 billion of surplus with China. And, uh, and, and as you noted, uh, we are seeing more industrial goods
Going to China and also coming from Ch- from China and being finished here by Chinese or Brazilian companies.
One, this trend can be explained because Brazilian tariffs, if you don't have a free trade agreement, are still very high. In fact, Mercosur tariffs, not only Brazilians, uh, Brazilian, it's very high.
So it ma- it, it makes sense for Chinese to invest in Brazil and have part of the production here.
We are seeing that in the auto sector, for example, there are two large investments, uh, being finished in Brazil now to produce electric cars, uh, in Brazil.
So, uh, we are going to see more of this intra-trade with Chinese companies or Brazilian subsidiaries in China. That's one trend that we, we think, uh, is going to happen.
On the other hand, uh, Brazil knows that China will not, uh, transfer technology on critical minerals, for example. Brazil will try to develop.
Brazil just signed an, an agreement this weekend with Korea for joint development on, on the, the, on the mineral side. The same thing about, uh, about a free trade agreement.
Uh, although Lula and Xi have, have spoken about a free trade agreement, certainly there will be a lot of resistance from the Brazilian, uh, uh, uh, industrial sector, so it's not something for the near term.
And, uh, I mean, uh, when we talk about, uh, these, um, trade relationships, we are taping this on August the 3rd, and, uh, Brazil's industry and trade minister is traveling to India to try to deepen bilateral tr- uh, uh, relations.
What is, what are the opportunities that Brazil can, uh, open up in India and, um, how would that be a game changer for Brazil?
Yeah, I, I, I, India is a huge market and Brazilian participation is very small, really small. We have a small agreement, a partial agreement between Mercosur and India, but, uh, w- it should be expanded.
So one opportunity to expand, uh, there is a proposal to expand this agreement through at least 5,000 items and th- that could increase bilateral trade. Also, uh, India is a huge consumer market.
It's gaining, uh, uh, income, so they are, they are going to consume more protein. That's a factor.
And Brazil could compete a lot in, in, in not only beef, there are some limits, religious li- limits, but, but poultry and many other, uh, products. The same thing if you look at industrial cooperation.
There is already some industrial cooperation pharmaceuticals. Uh, there are some Indian companies invested in Brazil, and they are more and more interested on, on mining and critical minerals in Brazil, too.
So that's another sectors where we see more Indian investment come here. There's a lot of potential because, uh, trade varies, is, is still very small. Well, Guilherme Vaz de Mello, thank you very much.
Always a pleasure talking to you. A great pleasure. Thank you.
Well, uh, we're wrapping up, uh, this episode of Explaining Brazil, and thank you for listening and follow us on wherever you get your podcasts, and also subscribe to The Brazilian Report at brazilian.report.
Thank you very much.